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ABSTRACT
A persistent challenge to deliver a socially just and ecologically sus-
tainable development for emerging cities in non-Western countries
is that legitimacy and effectiveness often hinge on the normalizing
effect of international ‘models’ and ‘standards’ defined by the devel-
oped countries. In cases such as Shanghai’s latest urban sustainabil-
ity programme, a fixation on excelling at ‘global indicators’ has led
its promises of inclusive social progress astray. We argue this is not
simply because Shanghai authorities didn’t ‘get’ just sustainability,
but highlights a more rooted subaltern anxiety that constrains their
perceptions on how their programmes should be identified and
delivered. Drawing on Bourdieu’s theorization of how social agency’s
‘logic of practice’ is connected to their positions in the ‘field’, we
investigate a shared epistemic deference among Shanghai experts
and publics toward knowledge generated from international experi-
ences. This has reproduced a marginalization of the subaltern public
in the field of developing sustainable cities.
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For many late-comers to urban sustainability, especially those with an emerging econ-
omy, sustainability agendas are opportunities to (re)establish themselves. Yet no sustain-
ability agenda is developed in a political vacuum and is always a negotiated product at
the confluence of global and local possibilities. While since early 2000, there has been
an increased recognition of promoting programmes of ‘just sustainability’ which address
not only environmental concerns but also social inequalities (see Agyeman, Bullard, and
Evans 2003; Agyeman 2008), it is also widely recognized that pursuance of just sustain-
ability can easily become just another rhetoric to revamp old development rationales
rather than support inclusive social progress (Lombardi et al. 2011; While, Jonas, and
Gibbs 2004).
A particular challenge to less democratic and/or less developed societies is that key
indicators for sustainability and how they should be prioritized and achieved are often
steered by discussions in the West. Consequently, while responding to domestic dispar-
ities, the perceived legitimacy of local actors often hinges on the normalizing effect of
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international ‘models’ and ‘standards’ (De Lara 2018; Faber and McCarthy 2003). A
recent example is Shanghai’s latest sustainability programme, the 2017–2035 Master
Plan. It was endorsed by both the central and municipal governments with the ambition
to set ‘a Chinese definition of an excellent global city’ (Feng and Hu 2018, emphasis
added). But instead of being based on Shanghai particularities, the Master Plan was
articulated through achieving a higher ranking in various global indexes (Shanghai
Municipality 2018a). Consequently, Shanghai’s promise of being an ‘innovative, human-
istic and green’ city for all, slips into a conventional trajectory found in other Chinese
eco-cities where metrics were achieved at the cost of exacerbating social disparities
(Caprotti 2014; Chiu 2012; Fu and Zhang 2017; Liu et al. 2019).
As we argue in this paper, this pronounced mismatch between Shanghai’s aims and
approach are not simply because Shanghai authorities were not committed ‘enough’.
Rather it underlines a subaltern mentality that conditions the socio-political legitimiza-
tion and space of sustainability programmes. Being a global finance center, Shanghai as
a city is much more developed than most of its peers and is also not a newcomer to
sustainable development. In fact, after successful delivery of the World Expo with the
theme ‘Better City, Better Life’ (城市 , 让生活更美好) Shanghai was already endorsed
by the UN as the world model for sustainable development in 2011 (UNDESA (United
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs) 2011). Encapsulated by a 36-page
UN publication titled the Shanghai Manual, the city laid out its vision and policy sug-
gestions on pursuing balanced growth, and cultivating an open and sharing multicul-
tural society. Yet strikingly, in the new Master Plan, this Shanghai Manual was not
mentioned. Instead, various global city indexes published in Japan, UK and US were
cited in the first chapter to remind the readers of the ‘international status’ gap Shanghai
had yet to close with top global cities; in addition the new Master Plan (rather than the
Shanghai Manual) was the blueprint for achieving ‘Better City, Better Life’.
What makes Shanghai’s case insightful is that it shows how inclusivity and fairness
can get lost even when the value of just sustainability was recognized and comprehen-
sive public consultation were in place. On the one hand, the Master Plan saw ‘achieving
social justice and green development’ as its ‘foundation’ from its very conception (Feng
and Hu 2018). As this paper later demonstrates, in terms of its design, consultation and
delivery process, Shanghai not only ‘ticked all the boxes’ but has, to some extent,
expanded domestic political consultation to various publics. On the other hand, despite
being at its early stage, there is already a strong indication that Shanghai’s ambition has
slipped into a conventional trajectory found in other Chinese eco-cities where sustain-
ability targets are met through what we term ‘enclosure’ sustainability. That is, an image
of sustainability is established by focusing on a collection of metrics and by enclosing
social and environmental resources to a select population.
Arguably it is precisely the contrast between Shanghai being a well-resourced and
relatively high-profile regional municipal, and its persistent dependency on international
recognition and approval that makes it especially informative in the subaltern struggle
within the (global) ‘field’ of sustainability. As we further specify in the next section, the
term ‘subaltern’ in this paper are used to refer to a social actor’s perceived position in
the global epistemic hegemony of sustainable urbanization. Following Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak (1988) and Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2002), we use the term
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subaltern not simply to describe the socio-politically ‘oppressed’, but to refer to develop-
ing regions’ marginalized status and unequal influence in a Western-dominated dis-
courses and practices. By the word ‘field’ we invoke Pierre Bourdieu’s (1969, 1990)
theorization of the effects of power imbalance. From a Bourdieusian perspective, a field
is a social space organized around specific stakes (such as promoting sustainability), in
which social agencies struggle and compete for power and their ‘logic of practice’ are
connected to their positions in the field (Pellandini-Simanyi 2014).
Our argument is a modest but important one: By making visible how Shanghai’s fix-
ation on excelling at ‘global indicators’ led a just program astray, and yet why it ‘made
sense’ to local decision-makers and practitioners, we argue that this positional difference
of the subaltern has significant impact on how sustainability is translated on the ground.
This is an important point that is often implied in various literature but empirically
under-explored. While a large volume of studies have repeatedly pointed out how both
distributive and procedural justice in sustainability programs can be improved with
wider civic engagement and better participatory governance, well-informed local author-
ities and professional communities (such as in the case of Shanghai) remain susceptible
to repeating the same mistakes (see Schroeder et al. 2008; Stirling, Scones, and Leach
2010; Xie 2009; Zhang and Barr 2013). One of the key reasons, as suggested by this
study, is a subaltern anxiety that frames (or rather constrains) their perceptions on how
their programs should be legitimized and delivered. As sociologist Michael Lorr (2012)
rightly pointed out, only when one comprehends the mentality (or what Lorr calls
‘ideology’) underlying particular urban sustainable developments, can one discern the
cause and consequences of these initiatives. It is only when we are able to empathize
with the subaltern struggles can we start to identify practical solutions to minimize sus-
tainability commitments go astray.
A Bourdieuian Lens on the Subaltern Struggle with Sustainability
Subaltern is not an identity but a position (Spivak 1999). More specifically, it is a social
actor’s perceived position of their unequal relations of power, their marginalized role in
epistemic hegemonies. A Bourdieuian interpretation of power asymmetries and social
agency through the relational thinking of a field is most helpful in making visible the
epistemic deference and power imbalances that shape subaltern societies’ cognitive
framework (Go 2013). There are three interrelated ‘thinking tools’ to a Bourdieuian the-
orization on power and action: habitus, capital and field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1989,
50). Habitus is a system of dispositions (e.g. education, family history) of social agents
(be it people or institutions) which structures their present and future practices
(Bourdieu 1990). Field is ‘a relatively autonomous universe of specific relations’, a social
space with its specific rules and pursuits, occupied by social agents whose position is
structured by their set of capital and their relations to one another (Bourdieu 1969, 77).
For example, the global arena of sustainable urban development constitutes a field
occupied by different cites, each with their own socio-political configurations (habitus).
In this field, each city, such as Shanghai competes for recognition and influence, by
strategically investing their cultural, economic and social resources in exchange for
accumulating credibility and domination, or in Bourdieuian terms ‘symbolic power’.
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It must be added that using ‘Shanghai’ as a totality in the example is not to negate the
multiplicities of agencies within Shanghai. To be sure, the ‘field’ of sustainable
urban development can also be ‘zoomed-in’ to reveal further details and issue-specific
sub-politics within each city. However, a certain level of abstraction is needed to make
out the subaltern positioning of Shanghai so as to appreciate how this positioning may
shape its deliberations. Furthermore, this vision of Shanghai moving up its position in
the global arena of sustainability was not only explicit in Shanghai’s ‘public explainer’
version of its Master Plan (SUPLRAB (Shanghai Urban Planning and Land Resource
Administration Bureau) 2018), but also, as our interview data demonstrates, functions
as the overarching justification for channeling (or diminishing) various domestic sub-
politics into a coordinated delivery of urban development.
More importantly, field position has a structuring effect on a social agency’s strategy
for competing in the field (Bourdieu 1990). The valorization to certain types of know-
ledge and practice over others, for example, has a formative if not disciplinary impact
on a social actor’s calculation on how to elevate their status. The extent of such struc-
turing effect may be especially prominent on subaltern actors. This is because, the pos-
ition of the subaltern is not a place to stay, but always prompts the urge to transit from
the margin toward the center (Sharp 2009). A central irony, however, as Spivak (1999,
270–272) repeatedly pointed out is that the way for the subalterns successfully to make
themselves heard in the global arena is to adapt to the hegemonic grammar. Instead of
subverting or shaking the hegemonic dominance, their move toward the center would
inevitably betray their subaltern experience. In other words, as social actors internalize
dominate expectations and norms in the field, the relation of powers and distribution of
resources are reproduced (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 139–140; Burawoy 2019).
Such subaltern ‘paradox’ was exhibited in the Brazilian city Curitiba’s sustainable urban
planning. While Curitiba earned its reputation as a model sustainable city by winning
numerous international awards, empirical research pointed out a ‘split between dis-
course and reality’, as the city’s development was stifled or ‘locked in’ by hegemonic
discourses ‘constructed and reproduced trough powerful domestic and international net-
works’ (Martınez et al. 2016, 358).
The problem lies not in the aspiration for (and in Curitiba’s case, success in) global
recognition itself but highlights a particular subaltern insecurity. As we demonstrate in
the Shanghai case, the desperation for legitimacy and the pressure to progress have
turned Shanghai’s original pursuit of a just sustainability into just another short-term
race of metrics. Despite its multi-layered coordination and consultation, the Master
Plan has not construed new global excellence, but has paradoxically reinforced gaps in
social and environmental justice.
Embedding Shanghai’s 2017–2035 Master Plan in China’s Quest of Just
Sustainability
It is useful to put Shanghai’s Master Plan in the wider context of Chinese pursuit of
sustainability. While many studies on pollution and emission controls have examined
how metric and target-settings have served as ‘index-evaluation systems’ for China’s
central government to monitor performance at the provincial and municipal levels
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(Hsu, de Sherbinin, and Shi 2012, 40; Kostka 2016; Li 2019), Shanghai’s Master Plan
was not a top-down mandate assigned by the central government. Rather, Shanghai
Municipal was responsible to design and deliver an urbanization plan which concretizes
China’s official development principles of ‘innovation, coordination, green, open and
sharing’ (Shanghai Municipality 2018b). Thus, its identification of goals and pathways
have made the Master Plan a particularly insightful case in understanding the ambition
and limits of China’s pursuit of sustainability. Conversely, key characters of China’s
domestic rhetoric on sustainability also helps to contextualize the making of the
Master Plan.
At one level, China seems to ‘get’ sustainability in a way that many Western societies
still do not. While China’s official rhetoric falls short of adopting academic terminology,
the ethos of China’s environmental governance in the past 20 years bear close resem-
blance to that of the just sustainability discourse. Firstly, there is a dual commitment to
both inter- and intra-generational justice. In contrast to the more influential interpret-
ation of ‘sustainable development’ given by the Brundtland Report which emphasized
protecting inter-generational justice (WCED 1987), in Chinese discussions, this concept
has been given a ‘spatial’ dimension. That is, development is only considered sustainable
if it meets the needs of a region or a nation without endangering the ability of people
in other regions and nations to meet their own needs (Ye 1995). This echoes Agyeman,
Bullard and Evans Agyeman, Bullard, and Evans (2003, 5, emphasis added) definition of
just sustainability: ‘the need to ensure a better quality of life for all, now, and into the
future, in a just and equitable manner, whilst living within the limits of supporting eco-
systems’. Secondly, China mirrors the just sustainability’s call for pro-actionary capacity
building (Faber and McCarthy 2003; Walker 2009). That is, responsible and fair devel-
opment is not simply about the equal distribution of environmental ‘goods’ and ‘bads’.
Rather, it should minimize environmental and social injustice being produced in the
first place (De Lara 2018; Broto and Westman 2017). Shanghai in particular is a
regional hub seeking scientific solutions to sustainability problems. In fact, Shanghai’s
Master Plan was originally launched in 2016, which was over-written by the current
2017–2035 Mater Plan a year later. A key update in this later version was an emphasis
on the role of science and innovation in a sustainable future. For example, the 2035
Mater Plan has pledged its R&D (Research and Development) investment to be 5.5% of
the city’s GDP, up from the 5% pledged in the earlier version (Shanghai Municipality
2018a, 21; 2016a, 92).
But at another level, China’s quest for a socially just and ecologically sustainable
development program is also deeply rooted in its position as a developing country. In
the second half of the 20th century, the emphasis on intra-generational equity was
necessary and instrumental for China to negotiate a fairer share of responsibility at
international conventions. Entering the new millennium, the political importance of the
intra-generational equity rhetoric has shifted to appease domestic unrest evoked by
socio-economic gaps and expanding environmental degradations (Barr 2012). The con-
cept of ‘ecological civilization’ was proposed by China’s former President Hu Jintao in
2007 to reassure the public that ‘social justice and fairness must be of great concern in
development’ and promised that ‘disadvantaged social groups can fairly enjoy the bene-
fits of development’ (China Daily 2007). Chinese president Xi Jinping’s 2019 address at
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the St Petersburg International Economic Forum stressed that inclusive sustainable
development holds the ‘golden key’ to world problems and pledged to promote co-
development with its international partners. In short, for Chinese authorities, sustain-
ability agendas have always been closely tied to their perceived political legitimacy and
competence. The Shanghai 2035 Master Plan is arguably one of China’s new showcases
in boosting its global status, and as the data section demonstrates, its conception was
shadowed by the same anxieties.
There is warranted skepticism toward what President Xi (2019) heralded as China’s
‘unswerving’ commitments to a green development. But given the economically driven
nature of these initiatives, many China observers worry that short term economic gain
will always trump social values and that inequality will be masked as meritocracy (Chiu
2012). Our findings reiterate this concern. When short-term (economic and cultural)
productivity pushes values such as diversity, empathy and solidarity and collaboration
aside, it perversely widens the socio-economic gaps that Shanghai set out to close.
Methodology
The paper is informed by our research on China’s environmental governance in the
past decade. Empirical research was carried out between 2018 and 2019 as part of a
larger project on sustainable urbanization funded by the Leverhulme Trust. Due to
China’s heightened censorship toward international scholar’s research activities, govern-
ment officials we were in contact with all declined to be interviewed, but they nonethe-
less put us in touch with key experts they worked with. In the end, we interviewed 10
individuals whose work has fed into or who have been involved in the drafting of the
Shanghai 2035 Master Plan. This includes 1 urban planning expert, 4 academics of
urban and development studies, 2 environmental protection professionals, 2 state-owned
energy company managers and 1 manager in a private energy company. As Dan
Guttman et al. (2018, 130) argued, the effect of ‘the shadow of state’ in China has
blurred the distinction between state and non-state actors. While our interviewees are
‘non-state actors’, their work with the government is conditioned upon their adherence
to the state’s vision of development. Public service units (such as urban planning aca-
demies) and large businesses with close government connections occupy ‘core roles’ in
devising and delivering environmental governance (Guttman et al. 2018, 133). As such,
these non-state actors and the sector they work in are conduits of the state’s vision.
Given our restricted sample size, we do not claim that our study represents a compre-
hensive account of the Shanghai expert community’s experience and discussions.
However, similar to other small sample studies published in Society and Natural
Resources (e.g. L€ofmarck and Lidskog 2019 and Pilgeram 2019), our study nonetheless
provides valuable insights on how both the achievements and shortfalls of the Master
Plan was rationalized and legitimized. Furthermore, we also want to highlight that both
our field observation, informal conversations with officials and related professionals
have affirmed that the making of Master Plan since 2016 has effectively forged a net-
work of experts who have come to a cohesive perspective on how sustainable urbaniza-
tion should be delivered in Shanghai. While these individuals may not agree on specific
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issues, as is demonstrated in the data section, there are similar patterns of views and
thinking processes that are evident across the five professions we interviewed.
The interviews were conducted by Xie in Mandarin. They each lasted an hour on
average and were recorded and transcribed. The interviews were analyzed in Mandarin
before being translated into English. The translation was carried out and verified by
both Xie and Zhang to ensure accuracy. The interviewees were asked of their interpreta-
tions of urban sustainability, their views on the social, economic and environmental
challenges of Shanghai’s urban development, their experience and/or view on the public
engagement process in the making and delivery of the 2035 Master Plan. In addition to
fieldwork notes, our analysis was also informed by an extensive review of official publi-
cations and press releases which are archived on Shanghai Municipality’s website (www.
shanghai.gov.cn) and gray literature published by quasi-government institutions (such
as the Shanghai Urban Planning and Design Research Institute and the Shanghai
Academy of Environmental Sciences). In addition to a systematic review of academic
publications on Shanghai urbanization in general, we’ve identified 28 academic papers
on the 2035 Master Plan published between 2014 and 2019 through Chinese Wanfang
database. These, along with various media reports, help to provide a more rounded
view on domestic debates on the Master Plan.
We followed an iterative and multi-levelled coding process (Yin 2010). Xie first
applied closed coding to the transcripts which were embedded in the interview sched-
ules. Examples of codes used in this process include ‘intention’, ‘incentive’, ‘process’,
‘activities’, ‘expectations’, ‘side-effects’, ‘evaluation of outcome’. Aided by fieldwork
notes, further literature review, writing analytic memos and discussions between the
authors, the transcripts were re-analyzed through a process of open coding to allow for
conceptual themes (Layder 2013; Campbell et al. 2013), such as ‘excellence’, ‘legitimacy’
and ‘public accountability’. As the data section shows, the interviewees were frank and
critical to the Master Plan’s shortfalls. They did not shy from sharing embarrassing mis-
takes they or their colleagues have made. Yet one intriguing underlying theme in our
interviews is how the ‘global’ has a constant presence in the interviewees’ reasoning and
evaluation of the Shanghai Master Plan. Thus, we conducted axial coding to identify
connections among the open codes (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Codes used includes
‘imaging the global’, ’epistemic deference’ and ‘reinforced marginalization’. While codes
were agreed by both Xie and Zhang, the actual coding process was done by Xie to
maximize consistency.
To unpack this ironic ‘necessity’ of the global in the interviewees’ making sense of the
local, in what follows, we first investigate how Shanghai identified its actions plans.
Findings suggest a shared pressure among experts to seek not local particularities but
global indexes as legitimizing device for their decisions. We then examine the paradox
in which Shanghai’s comprehensive public-consultations have effectively became a pub-
lic education campaign. A prominent factor for this paradox, we argue, was an epi-
stemic deference that attaches higher value and credibility to expert knowledge,
especially those generated from developed countries. Finally, we discuss how the Master
Plan’s intended inclusivity seemed to slip in a usual trap of ‘enclosure’, which not only
physically ‘walls off’ space and resources to a select population, but also re-enhances an
enclosure of social mentality.
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Identifying and Legitimizing Action Plans: Power of the ‘Global’
The experts we interviewed were both practical and strategic. They were practical in the
sense that all of them had an acute sense of embedding sustainable development with
Shanghai particularities. As put forward by Interviewee 5, ‘For us professionals, the
Master Plan is not simply drawing up a vision, but about addressing practical problems.
There are capacities that Shanghai yet need to develop and there are also chronic prob-
lems to be dealt with’. This attentiveness to the specificities of real-life concerns was
also reflected in the Shanghai Master Plan’s official explainer for public audiences. That
is, it did not simply state the will of developing Shanghai into ‘a charming and inclusive
city’, but it vividly illustrates what life would be like in such an urban space:
… the future Shanghai is a place where people may jog in the green spaces close to their
homes, and sit on the grass for a rest after jogging to watch birds fly by. As for drama
lovers, they may watch plays right within their neighborhood instead of travelling afar to a
grand theater. They may even voice their views about the play and improvise out of fun
and interest. For kids, they may play safely without worrying about being scratched or run
down by speeding vehicles. In a city with no neglected corner, everyone attends to each
other, cares for each other and supports each other. (SUPLRAB (Shanghai Urban Planning
and Land Resource Administration Bureau) 2018, 4)
We draw attention to the level and types of details included in this public explainer
is telling. For example, the reference to theater lovers poking fun at each other after see-
ing the latest show would strike a chord with many Shanghai residents. The Master
Plan did not shun from confronting the ‘ugly’ part of Shanghai life either, thus the note
on freeing children from the worry of being ‘run down by speeding vehicles’. It is safe
to say that the Master Plan was envisioned as a development agenda that spoke to
Shanghai’s daily life.
But our interviewees also confirmed that they needed to be highly strategic in intro-
ducing and validating action plans. Given Shanghai’s past experience, an effective way
to mobilize resources in revamping Shanghai’s sustainable development was to invoke
‘global’ rhetoric.
Many would say that the 2010 World Expo has brought forward Shanghai’s urbanization
by 20 years… most of it [the city’s infrastructure] were built around that time but the
height of that urban development is already past tense… Shanghai is relatively developed
and internationalized… But it experiences thorny problems at a level that few other cities
are dealing with, such as the ageing population… Shanghai needs to take a step further,
on a par with international excellence, like New York, London, Paris and Tokyo
(Interviewee 6).
As pointed out by the academic, Interviewee 6, global exposure, such as the 2010
Expo has stimulated welcoming changes in Shanghai’s urban space. But sustainability is
not a one-off campaign. Shanghai needs to revive its commitment from ‘past tense’ to
handle evolving social challenges. This was echoed by Interviewee 1, who described glo-
bal ambition as necessary to revamp Shanghai’s urban development as it was time to
‘reorient Shanghai to corresponding changes in China and in China’s global role’.
Language of ‘the global’ is also tactical in legitimizing action plans amid alternatives.
Not only were rankings between Shanghai and other metropolis in various global city
index cited in the Master Plan to make the case for the necessity of Shanghai’s
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(re)development, they also functioned as key benchmarks for Shanghai authorities to
keep their own action plans in check. Fieldwork for this study was conducted when
Shanghai was 18months into the delivery of the Master Plan. Yet how the overarching
aim of how ‘excellence’ should be translated practicality remained ‘very vague’ and to
be negotiated (Interviewees 1 and 4). It is not unusual for experts closely involved with
the Master Plan to draw on the ‘international’ to back up their views. Interviewee 5
who worked in the environmental protection agency, compared the specification of tar-
gets in the Master Plan to a process of ‘gaming’, in which quantitative comparison to
international experience often assumed a significant role in the negotiation and ‘selling’
of their proposed action plan.
Simple (cross-country) comparison of technical indicators actually says very little, but the
decision-makers like them…The making of the Master Plan was filled with gaming
strategies… [for every agenda we propose] we need to build in quantifiable references to other
international cities … The authority may be at a loss with your argument on why we cannot
should pursue target A and not target B, but if you frame your augment as “we can’t reach
Tokyo’s standards, but we can be like Singapore”, then the official may say well, Singapore is
not too bad, we can accept (to be like Singapore). We had to justify [our proposals] this way.
(Interviewee 5)
For consulted professionals, a prerequisite of translating the sustainability vision into
reality is to first translate their projected action plans into indexes used by various glo-
bal city rankings. Such translation added weight to the professionals’ recommendations
on the ‘whats’ and ‘hows’ of urbanization. This is not so much because these indexes
clarified Shanghai particularities, but because they provide a short-cut to legitimize how
expectations and priorities should be set.
Similar to many other cities, a challenge for Shanghai to develop a sustainable and
fairer future lies in how to translate that vision into feasible, effective and (politically)
accountable actions. Global indicators function both as a powerful source of socio-polit-
ical mobilization and as an important justification device. For Shanghai professionals,
the strive for global excellence paradoxically enabled and constrained them.
Symbolic Value vs. Symbolic Power
While global experience undeniably holds a Bourdieuian symbolic power in guiding
Shanghai’s urban planning, it does not mean that local voices were ignored. Regarding
the making and delivery of the Master Plan, two contradictory stories could be told,
both of which are true. On the one hand, the multi-level public engagement and con-
sultation programs that the Master Plan initiated was arguably ground-breaking in
China. The working group of the Master Plan was made of 40 research groups, 22
expert committees and 16 district governments. Planning authorities from neighboring
provinces, such as Jiangsu and Zhejiang were also consulted to ensure regional coordin-
ation (SUPLRAB (Shanghai Urban Planning and Land Resource Administration
Bureau) 2018, 12–13). More importantly, public consultation was seen as a critical elem-
ent in validating the Master Plan, as put forward by Interviewees 5 and 6:
It’s called “planning with the door open”. Once the draft is done, it needs to be publicized
to the society, out in the open, for at least a month. (Interviewee 5)
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Public consultation is a procedural must now… it is only when we get all the feedback
from the public can we proceed to the next round [of revision], only then can the Master
Plan be officially promulgated. (Interviewee 6)
To engage with the public, Shanghai Municipality set up a Public Participation
Group which rolled out a ‘Public Vision Survey’ in 2014, and founded a 15-member
public consultation committee to feed into the Master Plan (Fu 2014). Local news media
and online social platforms were also mobilized to publicize the renewed initiatives.
Public seminars, forums and art competitions were held at various levels to make public
informed and engaged (SUPLRAB 2018; SUPDRI 2014). According to official statistics,
a total of 1810 suggestions were received through three rounds of public consultation,
of which 707 were said to be incorporated into the Master Plan, 818 were already
addressed, and 285 were listed as ‘under consideration’ (Shanghai Municipality 2016b).
Interviewees recounted that feedback from public surveys helped to underwrite commit-
ments toward certain issues, such as building more schools and public facilities around
residence areas (Interviewees 1, 7).
However, interviewees suggested that the opposite could also be said. Interviewee 9, a
senior civil society campaigner who took part in the Master Plan’s various outreach,
described the public’s contribution as ‘symbolic’ as many of these assimilations were on
minor details, or as described by Interviewee 5, corresponded to what was ‘originally
included’ and that ‘the Master Plan didn’t change much after the public consultation’.
Interviewee 4 and his colleagues who worked at the Shanghai Urban Planning and
Design Research Institute, were put to the task of writing brochures for a general audi-
ence to publicize various aspects of the Master Plan. Although intended as a two-way
engagement, it effectively turned into one-way public education:
Realistically, there are only a few topics that ordinary urbanites can contribute to, such as
general visions, residential facilities etc. Big issues, such as water and energy supply or
waste disposal, all require professional knowledge, otherwise one has nothing to say.
(Interviewee 8)
Of course, we can assimilate some of the public opinion, but such planning is naturally
something for the professionals… Shanghai government made sure that the Master Plan
was drafted by experts that have the most advanced knowledge in their field. As a result, it
is a highly sophisticated piece of work informed by scientific calculation and
comprehensive designs. (Interviewee 4)
Globally, there have been many successful initiatives in empowering bottom-up par-
ticipation in urban sustainability (see Cuthill 2004; Zhang and Barr 2013), yet the power
asymmetry resulting from knowledge asymmetry remains a challenge. While the value
of public consultation was fully recognized, there remained a practical barrier for the
substance of public opinion to inform or compete with the ‘most advanced knowledge’
(Interviewee 4). Previous studies on just sustainability initiatives in New York have also
noted that Town Hall meetings were ‘more ceremonial than real’, in which the aim of
engaging with the public was ‘really to sell a plan that was already made’ (Angotti 2008;
Rosan 2012, 966).
Succumbing to professional expertise on ‘big issues’ (Interviewee 8) may be a particu-
lar barrier for just sustainability in regions that had a marginalized voice in the global
sustainability discourse. Imported frameworks used in shaping Shanghai’s agenda
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naturally had different priorities. For example, Interviewee 4 re-called that the planning
for new commercial center in Pudong drew on experience from a number of global cit-
ies and topped a range of relevant international metrics. However, bicycling lanes, a
public facility that would have been common sense to many private citizens, completely
escaped the minds of globally-informed experts. In the absence of models closer-to-
home to follow, international (i.e. Western) templates of sustainability, along with its
scientific and political technicalities, easily take overriding authority in shaping what
good urban development ‘should’ look like.
It would be unfair to say that Shanghai did not invest in participatory governance.
Through the scope and intensity of its public consultation, the Shanghai Municipality
ticked almost all the boxes of public outreach, and expanded the socio-political space in
significant ways. But comparing to the weight that was ‘naturally’ (Interviewee 4) pre-
scribed to international experiences, the value of public opinions in shaping the big pic-
ture remained minimal, or ‘symbolic’ as in the words of Interviewee 6. Given the
technical complexity of urban planning, the epistemic power asymmetry between the
experts and the lay public is inevitable. However, in the case of Shanghai, there seems
to be a double epistemic deference: a deference to technical knowledge and a deference
to international knowledge. Unsurprisingly, then, lay opinions are not something to be
explored but something that needs to be educated into a collective consensus.
Inclusive or Enclosure Sustainability?
In 2016, the year before the Master Plan’s formal launch, China’s income inequality was
among the world’s worst, with the socio-economic gap was most prominent in major
cities like Shanghai (Ni 2016; Wildau and Mitchell 2016). The Master Plan was intro-
duced partly to tackle this glaring disparity with inclusive and shared development
(Shanghai Municipality 2018a).
But evidence to date indicates that Shanghai’s intended just sustainability program
may turn out to be just another economic boost in the name of sustainability (Pow and
Harvey 2013). In the Global Urban Competitiveness Report jointly released by the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the United Nations Programme for Human
Settlements (UN-Habitat) in September 2019, Shanghai surpassed Hong Kong in terms
of economic competitiveness, despite the fact that there was still ‘large space for
improvement on being a livable city’ (Ni 2019). The aggravating social imbalance
Shanghai faced was open knowledge. Even the Chinese Communist Party’s publication
Banyuetan warned against Shanghai’s threatening level of socio-economic disparity (Ge,
Shen, and Sun 2019). The old central districts, such as Jing’an, Xuhui and Huangpu
remained a harbor for the wealthy where residential flats were sold at 60,000 RMB
(approximately 8,500US dollars) per square meters. Meanwhile, only a few miles away,
neighboring districts that were once crowded with factories such Zhaibei, Yangpu, and
Putuo remained what the locals refer to as hubs for the ‘poor wretches’ (Ge, Shen, and
Sun 2019). Thus while Shanghai ranking rises in various international urban indexes, it
seems to form new ‘ecological enclaves… for premium users that ignore wider distribu-
tional questions about uneven access to resource politics’ (Hodson and Marvin 2010,
311; Caprotti, Springer, and Harmer 2015; Romano 2015).
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The ‘oasis’ of resources and opportunities the Master Plan helped create is not simply
a physical enclave of prosperity but also an administrative ‘enclosure’ that has more
profound effects on social justice. Similar to many cities in emerging powers, domestic
wealth inequality and concentration of employment prospects have a double-down
effect on cities like Shanghai to draw large inflows of surplus labor. Historically, popula-
tion control has been at the center of Chinese urban development (Han and Wang
2013). While Shanghai’s population had already soared to 24.15 million by 2015
(Shanghai Statistic Bureau 2011), the Master Plan called on an ‘unyielding defense’ (lao-
lao shouzhu) of a population cap of 25 million by 2035 (Shanghai Municipality 2018a,
11). To achieve its sustainable urbanization, Shanghai has relied on two approaches.
Firstly, the Master Plan effectively relied on the strategy of ‘environmental gentrifica-
tion’ in which the city becomes greener by pushing uncompetitive groups further to the
margin (Checker 2011). To turn Shanghai into a city with ‘a 90% coverage of green and
public space larger than 400 square meters within 5minutes of walking distance by
2035’, it needs to reduce the population in its central district to below the 2015 level
(Shanghai Municipality 2018a, 29, 65; Shanghai Year Book Committee 2016). Thus, the
Master Plan aimed to build satellite towns to relocate the population (Shanghai
Municipality 2018a). Although many of these satellite towns borrowed heavily from
designs in world class cities, such as ‘Thames Valley’ London, they remain unattractive
to the public for lack of infrastructures that speak to local needs:
Irrespective of urban infrastructure or social welfare provision, these areas [new towns]
have a huge gap to close in comparison with Shanghai’s central area… This will be a big
problem in the next ten years. (Interviewee 6)
In addition to putting up with under-developed services in schools, hospitals, and as
most employments are still concentrated in the city center, residents relocated to these
new towns are likely to face prolonged daily commute to work. By nudging populations
with less economic means to move further out of the central districts, the Master Plan
has expanded and enhanced a geographic segmentation of social inequality (Liu
et al. 2019).
A more powerful administrative instrument Shanghai used in its urban planning is
the hukou (house registration) system. Hukou is different from a residence or work per-
mit. In fact, less than 50% of those currently living and working in Shanghai have a
Shanghai hukou. Rather, hukou functions as an official recognition of municipal respon-
sibility. Upon granting a city’s hukou, one is recognized as a citizen of that city and
thus has full access to its welfare provisions, such as pension, children’s schooling,
health insurance and housing subsidies (Song 2014). In other words, without a
Shanghai hukou, one can work and contribute to its growth for an entire working life
without being able to draw on its various social support mechanisms, or being consid-
ered as a ‘Shanghainese’. Acquiring a Shanghai hukou has always been notoriously diffi-
cult. ‘There is huge pressure to accommodate newcomers’ explained Interviewee 6, ‘so
from a planning perspective, many non-Shanghai residents will have to live in satellite
towns where social services are not comparable to the city proper’. In contrast to this
stringent control over domestic inflow of migrants, Shanghai endeavors to attract more
foreign talent; in the words of Interviewee 3, ‘Shanghai is not really open to newcomers;
it keeps them out and only takes in whoever it needs.’ Part of this comes from the
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pressure of boosting Shanghai’s global index ranking on cultural competitiveness, for
Shanghai is still substantially behind New York, Los Angeles and London in terms of its
foreign population (SIIS Research Team on City Diplomacy 2015, 31–5). Through this
highly purposeful selection of whom to be ‘admitted in’ and whom to be ‘kept out’,
Shanghai is also redefining what constitute ‘Shanghainese’. Instead being an identity
that embraces values such as diversity, empathy, solidarity and collaboration, progressive
urbanization has closed down ‘Shanghainese’ into a badge for the economic and know-
ledge elites.
As Shanghai attempts to sustain a world-class excellence through geographically dis-
tancing those less accomplished and through administrative ‘walling off’ its prosperity
to the non-selected, it has turned the intended inclusivity upside-down, and into what
we call an ‘enclosure sustainability’. We use this term not only to describe the ‘enclaves’
of space, resources, networks, and opportunities, but also an enclosure of social mental-
ity of what a sustainable urban space is and whom it is for. Our fieldwork suggested
that Hukou, along with its multiple implications on housing, education and access to
other social welfare remained the most prominent factor in skewing Shanghai’s Master
Plan into ‘enclosure sustainability’. But as China began to ‘experiment with metrics and
quantification of the value and virtue of its citizens’ (Wong and Dobson 2019, 220)
through its newly established social credit system powered by facial recognition and big
data, the question remains whether or not these national surveillance measures will
result in new forms of urban exclusion.
Conclusion
Shanghai is but one of many cities in the world that is wrestling with sustainability
ambition turned sour (Lombardi et al. 2011; Prudham 2009). Studies in North America
and in Europe have repeatedly demonstrated how sustainable programmes have been
hijacked by business and political interests and been reduced to a short-term
‘sustainability fix’ (Long 2016; While, Jonas, and Gibbs 2004) and how ‘genuine’ inclu-
sivity is difficult to achieve (Angotti 2008; Lombardi et al. 2011).
But Shanghai’s experience sheds light on particularities that many subaltern societies
are struggling with. Sustainable development symbolizes an opportunity to implement
long-term strategies that will put these emerging cities economically and politically on a
par with their counterparts in developed countries. Consequently, in addition to recog-
nizing local needs, authorities are often tasked with being recognized. Societies in the
developing world are more vulnerable to the ‘global’ imaginary in the sense that global
recognition functions as a legitimization device and as a containment for the deliber-
ation and delivery of action plans. To be sure, it is widely recognized that there are
multiple pathways to sustainability and even what constitutes ‘sustainability’ remains a
contested topic (Agyeman, Bullard, and Evans 2003). Delivering sustainability is
‘necessarily a political process’, which requires an ‘opening up’ of debate to include
diverse perspectives, ‘whereby assessments become necessarily positioned and partial,
constructed in relation to the social-economic-political subjectivities of the analyst’
(Stirling, Scones, and Leach 2010, 64). But global late-comers to urban sustainability
may be confronted with an additional challenge for such reflexive. For entering the
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global arena of sustainable development, their subaltern positions ironically make it dif-
ficult for them to ‘see’ their local needs (e.g. bicycle lanes), to attach values to their local
particularities (e.g. what constitutes ‘Shanghainese’). For Shanghai, a more empirical
rather than ‘index’ based agenda setting (as data section 1 indicates), an open-ended
public dialogue (as data section 2 indicates) and a step away from the ‘enclosure’ view
of sustainability as an elitist luxury (as data section 3 indicates) may help to steer the
Master Plan back to its original intentions.
It is not difficult to pinpoint ‘what’ went wrong in Shanghai’s just sustainability plans.
But it is perplexing ‘why’ well-informed and well-intended experts and authorities were
prone to repeat such mistakes. As China’s showcase metropolis, Shanghai enjoys much
more financial and human resource than many emerging cities. But it is precisely
Shanghai’s inability to resist being dominated by Western indexes, despite its (eco-
nomic) privileges, that makes it most revealing on how the primary subaltern position
of cities like Shanghai in the developing world constrains their perceived options in
their catching-up in a global field of urban sustainability. It is too early to ‘conclude’
where the Master Plan will eventually lead Shanghai, but its experience to date may be
an informative if not a warning tale to many other late-comers to urban sustainability
in their search for a good life.
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